On Disagreement

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1. Introduction

The topic of this article is what it takes for two individuals to disagree. In the unlikely event that someone is expecting a simple and informative answer, they will be disappointed. The main goal of the discussion is to provide an overview of some of the main issues and challenges that come up when we try to answer that question.

The purpose of sections 2 and 3 is to set the stage for the main discussion. In section 2 I clarify the boundaries of the discussion. In section 3 I introduce and tentatively defend the assumption that disagreement is a psychological phenomenon. The main discussion takes place in section 4-6. In section 4 I discuss what the attitudes of two individuals have to be like in order for them to disagree. A lot of the discussion focuses on the question of whether two individuals must have conflicting beliefs in order to disagree. In section 5 I propose that it makes sense to think of disagreement as a matter of having conflicting attitudes. I also consider two accounts of what it is for attitudes to be in conflict. In section 6 I discuss whether it is necessary to take into account the context in which the attitudes are held. This discussion is motivated by considerations involving propositions that have relative truth-values.

2. Preliminary Distinctions

It will be useful to start out by drawing some distinctions that will help establish the boundaries of the discussion. First and foremost, the focus will be on disagreement. However, it would also have been possible to focus on agreement. Many issues involving disagreement also come up in the case of agreement and vice versa.

Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne (2009: 60) distinguish between agreement as a state and agreement as an activity. Agreement as an activity is a matter of doing something and requires some form of interaction between the individuals who are involved. For instance, if someone makes a statement, there is a sense in which someone else may agree by uttering the sentence "I agree" in response, regardless of what she thinks about the matter. Agreement as a state, on the other hand, does not require interaction. For instance, if someone in Bogota and someone in Kuala Lumpur both believe that the Earth revolves around the Sun, then they may agree even if they are completely unaware of each other. Cappelen and Hawthorne suggest that the progressive use, as in "agreeing", is a sign that we are talking about the activity. That is also true of constructions like "agree to". As John MacFarlane (2014: 119) points out, this distinction also applies to disagreement. In what follows, the focus will be exclusively on disagreement as a state.

Another distinction has to do with what the relata of the disagreement-relation, the objects which disagreement is a relation between. In what follows, the focus will be on disagreement between two individuals. However, it seems that an individual may also disagree with, say, a proposition, action or attitude. For instance, if John says that it is raining in New York and Mary believes that it is not raining in New York, she may be taken to disagree with what John said.

Furthermore, two individuals may disagree about something and fail to disagree about something else. For instance, Mary and John may disagree about whether Stockholm is the

capital of Sweden, but agree that Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark. This may suggest that we should really focus on a three-place relation between two individuals and whatever it is that they disagree about. For similar reasons, MacFarlane (2014: 120) takes the target relation to be a relation between an individual and a speech act or attitude in context. However, in what follows, this complication will be downplayed as much as possible. That is a matter of convenience. In order to simplify the discussion, it will often be convenient to simply focus on the conditions under which there is something that two individuals disagree about.

3. Language and Thought

The next step is to start to locate the factors that make it the case that two individuals disagree. As a starting point, it is natural to think of disagreement between individuals as a psychological phenomenon. I take that to mean that whether two individuals disagree always depends at least partly on their attitudes, such as their beliefs. This is the line taken by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit in their discussion of moral disagreement.

> Moral disagreement, and indeed disagreement in general, is a psychological phenomenon. The production of sentences make public our disagreements; it does not create them. (Jackson and Pettit 1998: 251)

For the purpose of the following discussion, I am going to follow Jackson and Pettit and take disagreement to be a psychological phenomenon. That is a substantial assumption. It is also common to talk about disagreement in connection with speech acts like assertion (MacFarlane 2007: 22, 2014: ch. 6; Egan 2014: 76). That makes it tempting to say that whether two individuals disagree does not always depend on their attitudes. It sometimes depends on what they say. However, this is not as obvious as it may seem. When we talk about disagreement in connection with speech acts like assertion, it is important to remember the distinction between

disagreement as a relation between individuals and disagreement as a relation between an individual and a proposition or speech act.

It might be helpful to consider an example. Let us suppose that Mary asserts that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and that John asserts that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*. This looks like a case of disagreement, but the issue is by no means clear-cut. If Mary believes that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and that John believes that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*, then it seems right to say that they disagree. But if that is what is going on, the example does not give us a reason to think that their disagreement does not depend on their attitudes. The disagreement can be explained by their beliefs.

Alternatively, it could be that both Mary and John believe that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace*. While Mary's assertion is sincere, John's assertion is insincere. This is the more interesting version of the example insofar as the facts about their beliefs are not indicative of any disagreement. However, it is no longer clear that Mary and John disagree. There could still be disagreement in the sense that Mary disagrees with what John said. But it does not obviously follow that Mary and John disagree.

The tentative conclusion is that this kind of example does not give us a reason to abandon the assumption that disagreement is a psychological phenomenon, but there is a lot of room for further discussion. It is also worth noting that even if disagreement is a psychological phenomenon, what we say can still provide evidence for disagreement because it can provide evidence about our attitudes, such as our beliefs.

4. Attitudes

At this point, a natural question is what the attitudes of two individuals have to like in order for them to disagree. In particular, a question that will occupy a central role in the following discussion is whether two individuals disagree only if they have conflicting beliefs. It is

uncontroversial that when two individuals disagree, this is sometimes a matter of them having conflicting beliefs. That is what is going on when Mary and John disagree about who wrote *War and Peace*. Mary believes that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and John believes that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*. More needs to be said about what it is for beliefs to be in conflict, but for now it is sufficient to observe that the proposition that John believes is the negation of the proposition that Mary believes.

Many cases of disagreement fit this pattern. The more interesting question is whether they all do. In other words, the question is whether we ought to endorse the following view, in the form of a necessary condition for disagreement:

> CONFLICTING BELIEFS
>
> Necessarily, two individuals disagree only if they have conflicting beliefs.

This view is not without supporters. Derek Parfit expresses the view very concisely: 'For people to disagree, they must have conflicting beliefs' (Parfit 2011: 385). MacFarlane even suggests that something along these lines may seem like an obvious view.

> The obvious thing to say is that they disagree just in case
>
> > ACCEPT/REJECT. There is a proposition that one party accepts and the other party rejects.
>
> Perhaps it is because Accept/Reject is such an obvious answer that philosophers have not wasted much ink on the question of what it is to disagree. (MacFarlane 2007: 22)

MacFarlane formulates the view in terms of acceptance and rejection instead of belief, but for present purposes that is not too important. While he goes on to emphasize how difficult it is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for disagreement, MacFarlane (2007: 24) still treats disagreement as a matter of accepting and rejecting propositions. However, in later work, he

distances himself from CONFLICTING BELIEFS as a necessary condition for disagreement (MacFarlane 2014: ch. 6).

While CONFLICTING BELIEFS has its supporters, it also has its opponents. Following Charles L. Stevenson (1937, 1944, 1963), it is common to recognize a distinction between so-called "disagreement in belief" and so-called "disagreement in attitude" or "disagreement in interest". While the former involves conflicting beliefs, the latter involves a conflict of non-doxastic attitudes. Non-doxastic attitudes are attitudes other than belief, such as desires or preferences.

While Stevenson's distinction is influential, there is a sense in which his terminology of "disagreement of attitude" and "disagreement in belief" might be unhelpful. For the purpose of the present discussion, "attitude" is used in a broader sense that also applies to belief. Having that in mind, it makes less sense to talk about a distinction between disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. Having conflicting beliefs is just one way of having conflicting attitudes. If Stevenson is right, there are other ways of having conflicting attitudes. As far as I can see, this is merely a terminological point. For the purpose of the present discussion, the important idea is that it is possible for there to be disagreement that involves non-doxastic attitudes and not conflicting beliefs

Stevenson is not alone in thinking that disagreement can involve non-doxastic attitudes. Normative expressivists, such as Simon Blackburn (1984: 168, 1998: 69) and Allan Gibbard (2003: 68-71), often appeal to disagreement involving non-doxastic attitudes in order to explain normative disagreement. Roughly speaking, normative expressivism is the view that normative sentences express non-doxastic attitudes. However, one does not have to be an expressivist in order to reject CONFLICTING BELIEFS and think that disagreement can involve non-doxastic attitudes (Dreier 1999; Björnsson and Finlay 2010; Sundell 2010; Huvenes

2012, 2014; Egan 2014; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 6; Marques and García-Carpintero 2014; McKenna 2014; Marques 2015; Richard 2015).

A problem with CONFLICTING BELIEFS is that there are cases of disagreement that it does not capture. Stevenson uses the following example to illustrate the distinction between disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude or interest:

> Let me give an example of disagreement in interest. A. "Let's go to a cinema to-night." B. "I don't want to do that. Let's go to the symphony." A continues to insist on the cinema, B on the symphony. This is disagreement in a perfectly conventional sense. (Stevenson 1937: 27)

I take it that there is a way of understanding Stevenson's example such that the two individuals disagree, but do not have conflicting beliefs. They are talking about what they want to do and there is no indication that they conflicting beliefs. Insofar as the example shows that is possible to disagree without having conflicting beliefs, that means that CONFLICTING BELIEFS is false.

In order to resist this conclusion, one could maintain that no matter how the example is fleshed out, it will either turn out that the two individuals do not disagree or that they have conflicting beliefs after all. For instance, there may be ways of fleshing out the example such that they disagree about what they ought to do or something along those lines. In that case, they could still be construed as having conflicting beliefs. One of them believes that they ought to go to a cinema and the other believes that they ought not to go to a cinema. However, as far as I can tell, the disagreement remains even if assume that they do not have any relevant beliefs about what they ought to do.

If the two individuals in Stevenson's example do not have conflicting beliefs, then what explains their disagreement? A natural answer is that they have conflicting desires and that is sufficient for disagreement. One of them has the desire that they go to a cinema, while the other has the desire that they do not go to a cinema. This takes us back to the question of what the attitudes of two individuals have to like in order for them to disagree. If the proposed explanation of Stevenson's example is on the right track, disagreement is sometimes a matter of having conflicting desires.

The disagreement in Stevenson's example has a practical dimension. The two individuals are trying to settle on a course of action. But that is not necessary in order to have a disagreement involving conflicting desires. For instance, it could be that Mary and John disagree because Mary has the desire that the company hires Harry, while John has the desire that the same company does not hire Harry. That could be the case even if they are not involved in the decision in any way. As before, one could argue that the disagreement depends on them having a disagreement about whether Harry ought to be hired or whether he is the best candidate. But that is still not obvious. For instance, it could be that they both believe that Harry is one of several candidates that are equally qualified and deserve to be hired. That does not make it the case that they do not disagree, but it makes it more difficult to argue that they have to be understood as having a disagreement about whether Harry ought to be hired.

So far the focus has been on cases of disagreement involving conflicting beliefs or desires. But it also makes sense to talk about disagreement in connection with other attitudes. In addition to desires, Stevenson (1944: 3) mentions purposes, aspirations, wants, and preferences. James Dreier (2009: 105-106) takes preferences, as opposed to desires, as his paradigm when he discusses attitudes that can be involved in disagreement. It is possible that the list can be extended even further. For instance, if someone likes something that someone else dislikes, that could also be a case of disagreement (Weatherson 2009: 347; Huvenes 2012). It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of these attitudes in detail. However,

it would not be surprising if it turned out that disagreement could involve a wide range of attitudes.

Having said that, there are attitudes that probably do not belong on the list. For instance, it is more difficult to find cases of disagreement involving imagination. It is not sufficient for disagreement if someone imagines that so-and-so is the case and someone else imagines that so-and-so is not the case. In that case, there is no apparent conflict. This will be relevant when we consider what it takes for attitudes to be in conflict.

5. Conflict

In the previous section, it was proposed that disagreement could involve a range of attitudes. At this point, I propose to think of disagreement as always being a matter of having conflicting attitudes, with "attitudes" still being used in a broad sense that includes belief. That amounts to endorsing the following view, in the form of a necessary and sufficient condition for disagreement:

CONFLICTING ATTITUDES

Necessarily, two individuals disagree if only if they have conflicting attitudes.

There is a sense in which this does not say much. For instance, someone who endorses CONFLICTING BELIEFS could endorse CONFLICTING ATTITUDES and insist that the only way of having conflicting attitudes is to have conflicting beliefs. The question is what the relevant attitudes are and what it takes for them to be in conflict. In the previous section, the focus was on the former question. In this section, the focus will be on the latter question.

There are several ways in which one might try to develop a substantive account of what it takes for attitudes to be in conflict. In what follows, the plan is to focus on two prominent proposals in the literature. It might be more accurate to talk about two families of proposals,

but for present purposes we will gloss over some of the subtle differences. The first proposal appeals to rationality or coherence. The idea is that it is impossible for a single individual to rationally and coherently have both attitudes at the same time. Dreier (2009: 106) seems to have something like this in mind. It is also similar to what MacFarlane (2014: 121-123) calls "noncotenability" of attitudes. Let us state the proposal as follows:

RATIONALITY

Necessarily, two attitudes are in conflict if and only if it is impossible for a single individual to rationally and coherently have both attitudes at the same time.

For instance, let us again suppose that Mary believes that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and John believes that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*. It is arguably impossible for a single individual to rationally and coherently believe that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and at the same time believe that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*. According to RATIONALITY, that is sufficient for Mary and John's beliefs to be in conflict.

The second proposal appeals to satisfaction. The idea is that it is impossible for both attitudes to be satisfied. There are several proposals along these lines in the literature (Jackson 2008; Marques and García-Carpintero 2014: 718; Marques 2015: 6). Stevenson also makes some suggestions that point in this direction:

The difference between the two sense of "disagreement" is essentially this: the first involves an opposition of beliefs, both of which cannot be true, and the second involves an opposition of attitudes, both of which cannot be satisfied. (Stevenson 1963: 2)

The proposal can be stated as follows:

SATISFACTION

Necessarily, two attitudes are in conflict if and only it is impossible for both attitudes to be satisfied.

It is worth noting that "satisfaction" is being used in broad sense. Simplifying somewhat, for beliefs, satisfaction is a matter of the belief being true. In the case of desire, satisfaction is a matter of the desire being fulfilled. For instance, let us suppose that Mary has the desire that the company hires Harry, while John has the desire that the same company does not hire Harry. In that case, it is impossible for both Mary's desire and John's desire to be fulfilled. Similarly, if Mary believes that Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* and John believes that Tolstoy did not write *War and Peace*, then it is impossible for both Mary's belief and John's belief to be true.

There are problems with both proposals, but let us start with RATIONALITY. One worry is that the plausibility of the proposal depends on what counts as rational and coherent. This is particularly worrisome once we take into accounts attitudes other than beliefs. For instance, Teresa Marques (2015: 6) raises the worry that the circumstances under which it is irrational to have a pair of attitudes like desires may be limited. Desires may not subject to the right kind of coherence constraints. It may even be that it is never irrational to have a pair of desires. In that case, there would not be any cases of conflicting desires according to RATIONALITY.

The worry is not just that coherence constraints apply too narrowly. Let us suppose that desires are in fact subject to coherence constraints. If Mary has the desire to become a physicist and John has the desire not to become a physicist, one may be reluctant to say that this is sufficient for them to disagree. In this case, there is a sense in which Mary's desire only concerns what happens to her and John's desire concerns what happens to him. However, one could argue that it is impossible to rationally and coherently have both attitudes. According to

RATIONALITY, that means that they have conflicting attitudes. How pressing this worry is depends on what the contents of the desires are. For instance, the worry becomes more pressing if we think of the contents of the desires as properties, along the lines suggested by David Lewis (1979). In order to have both attitudes, one would have to have the desire to possess the property of becoming a physicist and the desire not to possess that property. On the other hand, if the content of Mary's desire is the proposition that she becomes a physicist and the content of John's desire is the proposition that he does not become a physicist, it is possible to rationally and coherently have both attitudes. In the next section, we will discuss further complications that have to do with the contents of propositional attitudes.

There are also problems with SATISFACTION. One worry is that we end up with less conflict and disagreement than we might have hoped. For instance, insofar as there is a conflict between liking something and disliking it, that conflict is not captured by SATISFACTION. If Mary likes the taste of haggis and John dislikes the taste of haggis, there is nothing that prevents their attitudes from being satisfied (Marques 2015: 6).

There is also the worry that we end up with too much conflict and too much disagreement. If it is impossible for an attitude to be satisfied, then that attitude is in conflict with any other attitude. For instance, it is impossible for the belief that $2 + 2 = 5$ to be true. That means that it is also impossible for the belief that $2 + 2 = 5$ and the belief that Nairobi is the capital of Kenya to be true. According to SATISFACTION, that means that these attitudes are in conflict. But that is not a great result. If Mary believes that Nairobi is the capital of Kenya and John believes that $2 + 2 = 5$, then that should not be sufficient for them to be disagree.

This is arguably a result of SATISFACTION being formulated in modal terms. MacFarlane (2014: 126) uses the term "preclusion" and talks about one attitude precluding the satisfaction of another. Using his terminology, we can say that two attitudes are in conflict if and only if the satisfaction of one attitude precludes the satisfaction of the other attitude. However,

MacFarlane declines to give an analysis of "preclusion" in modal terms in order to avoid the problem with attitudes that it is impossible to satisfy. Perhaps no analysis of "preclusion" is required, but it is worth considering whether that could also be said about "conflict".

If the choice is between RATIONALITY and SATISFACTION, then it might be better not to choose. Even in the absence of worked out third alternative, it would be a mistake to assume that either RATIONALITY or SATISFACTION have to be correct. Perhaps some of the difficulties can be lessened by thinking of the proposals as identifying different varieties of conflict and disagreement, along the lines suggested by MacFarlane (2014: 119). But even that is not obvious.

6. Context

So far we have been ignoring an important complication. It is natural to think that whether two individuals have conflicting attitudes only depends on the attitudes that they have. For instance, it is sufficient for two individuals to disagree if one of them believes a proposition and the other believes its negation. But that turns out to be problematic if propositions have relative truth-values. In that case, one only also needs to take into account the context in which the propositions are believed (MacFarlane 2007: 23). In what follows, the focus will be beliefs, but these issues are also relevant for other propositional attitudes. More generally, the idea is that whether there is a conflict of attitudes depends partly on the context in which the attitudes are held.

For instance, let us suppose that the contents of beliefs are so-called "temporally neutral" propositions, propositions that are true or false relative to times. If I believe the temporally neutral proposition that I am hungry, I believe something that is true relative some times, but false relative to other times. That is different from believing the temporally specific proposition that I am hungry at 2 p.m. on the 1st of January 2016. Using an example from MacFarlane (2007: 22) as a template, let us suppose that at 2 p.m. Mary believes the

temporally neutral proposition that Harry is sitting and that at 3 p.m. John believes the temporally neutral proposition that Harry is not sitting. The proposition that John believes at 3 p.m. is the negation of the proposition that Mary believes at 2 p.m., but Mary and John do not disagree. Their beliefs concern different times and it is possible that John was sitting at 2 p.m., but at 3 p.m. John was not sitting. Similar cases can be constructed if propositions are true or false relative to other parameters, such individuals or locations.

One might take this to be a problem for the view that the contents of beliefs are temporally neutral propositions (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 98). If Mary believes the temporally specific proposition that Harry is sitting at 2 p.m. and John believes the temporally specific proposition that Harry is not sitting at 3 p.m., the propositions they believe are consistent and it is not surprising that they do not disagree. However, MacFarlane (2007: 22-23) argues that the point can also be made if propositions are true or false relative to possible worlds. That is significant insofar as the view that propositions are true or false relative to possible worlds is more widely accepted than the view that propositions are true or false relative to times. Let us suppose that Mary, who inhabits the actual world, believes that Mars has two moons and that John, who inhabits another possible world, believes that Mars does not have two moons. The proposition that John believes is the negation of the proposition that Mary believes, but Mary and John do not disagree.

It should be noted that these examples, involving individuals in different worlds, are contentious. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 64) argue that MacFarlane's example does not work. It does not show that there are two individuals, one who believes that Mars has two moons and one who does not believe that Mars has two moons, that despite this fail to disagree. To say that there is a possible world in which someone believes that Mars does not have two moons, does not entail there is someone who believes that Mars does not have two moons. It only entails that it is possible that there is someone who believes that Mars does not have two moons. MacFarlane (2007: 23, 2014: 128) argues that the point can be made

without talking about individuals in different possible worlds. Instead, we can ask whether Mary disagrees with the belief state that John would have had in the counterfactual situation. However, questions remain about how these counterfactuals ought to be understood and how they should be evaluated (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 64-66; MacFarlane 2014: 128).

The lesson that MacFarlane (2007: 23) wants to draw is that we need to take into account the contexts in which the attitudes are held. For present purposes, it is not necessary to go into too much detail about how one might do that. One strategy is to adopt SATISFACTION and to be more careful about what this amounts to in the case of belief. This is more or less what MacFarlane (2007: 23, 2014: ch. 6) does by introducing the term "accuracy". Let us suppose that propositions are true or false relative to possible worlds and times. In that case, a belief is accurate if and only if the proposition that is believed is true relative to the possible world and time that is relevant in the context of the belief. In that case, we can say that a belief is satisfied if and only if it is accurate. This seems to work as intended in the case of temporally neutral propositions. While the time that is relevant in Mary's context is 2 p.m., it is 3 p.m. that is relevant in John's context. In that case, all it takes for both beliefs to be accurate is that at 2 p.m. Harry is sitting, but at 3 p.m. he is not sitting. According to SATISFACTION, that means that there is no conflict of attitudes.

However, there may be problems that this does not solve. Let us suppose that the proposition that John believes is the negation of the proposition that Mary believes, but that their beliefs are accurate. In that case, one might want to deny that they have conflicting attitudes. However, if Mary were to believe that John believes something false, that belief would also be accurate (MacFarlane 2007: 25). As Cappelen and Hawthorne (2011: 452) point out, then it should make sense for John to utter the sentence "She believes that what I believe is false, but she doesn't disagree with me". But that sounds strange, to say the least. This problem may be less pressing if we are only considering propositions that are true or false relative to times. In that case, the belief report would typically be in the past tense and that arguably makes it

easier to make sense of what John is saying. However, if one takes propositions to be true or false relative to other parameters, such as individuals or locations, this response is not available.

It should be noted that the preceding discussion also ignores complications having to do with a so-called "relativist" position. For instance, it has been proposed that sentences that contain predicates of taste like "fun" and "tasty" express propositions that are true or false relative to different individuals or standards or taste (Kölbel 2002; Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 2007; Richard 2008; Egan 2010; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 7). Similar ideas have been discussed in connection with other expressions, including knowledge ascriptions (Richard 2008: 166-176; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 8). Relativists have claimed to be in a strong position when it comes to making sense of disagreement. Let us suppose that Mary believes that haggis is tasty and John believes that haggis is tasty. Roughly speaking, the idea is that this is sufficient for Mary and John to disagree even if the proposition that haggis is tasty is true relative to Mary's standards and false relative to John's standards. But that requires a standard of taste parameter to be treated differently from, say, a time parameter. If the relevant times are different, as in the cases above, there is no disagreement. But if their standards of taste are different, there can still be disagreement. Much has been written about this (Dreier 2009; Francén 2010; Lasersohn 2013; Egan 2014: 94-98; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 8; Richard 2015), but a proper treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

7. Concluding Remarks

While many issues remain unresolved, it is worth taking note of some of the points that have been made. In particular, there are reasons to think that it is possible to disagree without having conflicting beliefs. While disagreement sometimes involving conflicting beliefs, it may also involve conflicting non-doxastic attitudes, such as desires or preferences.

It is natural to think of disagreement as a matter of having conflicting attitudes, with "attitude" being used in a broad sense that includes belief. However, it is unclear whether there is worked-out and satisfactory account of conflicting attitudes. There are problems with the two proposals that we considered. Perhaps these problems can overcome, or perhaps it is possible to develop another alternative, but that remains to be seen. As an additional complication, it may be that whether there is a conflict of attitudes also depends on the context in which the attitudes are held. However, this depends on some contentious issues having to do with propositions that have relative truth-values.

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